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Philosophy, Literature, Death, and Wisdom: 






Philip Kitcher’s study of Thomas Manns Death in Venice, paired 
with the Britten opera and the Visconti film that each adapted it, is ex-
traordinarily rich, reflective, and informed. One of its great virtues is its 
resistance to both simplistic reading and simplistic moralizing. That is, 
Kitcher undertakes not to offer the one straightforwardly correct reading 
of the novella centering around solutions to interpretive cruces such as 
“Why does, or must, Aschenbach die?” or “What does Mann really think 
about the value and allure of beauty?” or “Is Mann a Nietzschean?”. Nor 
does he undertake to extract from the novella and to defend any particu-
lar standard moral philosophy such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, or vir-
tue theory. Instead he reflects on multiple questions, issues, and themes 
that the novella raises, guided by how Britten and Visconti have taken up 
and emphasized certain strands of thematization that are present in the 
novella while suppressing others. The result is a kind of polyphonic med-
itation on human life, conducted by Kitcher, in which his readers are in-
vited and enabled to share, that is akin to the polyphonic meditation, as 
Kitcher rightly sees it, of Death in Venice itself. Kitcher’s way of reading 
and reflecting hence respects the richly textured structure of the novella in 
part by mirroring it in invoking large ideas about human life that are held 
in dramatic tension with one another and, in doing so, refusing pieties. 
I have nothing but sympathy and praise for both Kitcher’s way of 
proceeding and for the rich details of his reading and thinking. There is, 
however, some danger that his book will prove difficult to understand 
for both philosophers, accustomed to abstraction, formal argumentation, 
and theory, and literary scholars, accustomed to focusing on texts and 
contexts and shy about abstraction, philosophy, and intermedial compar-
isons. Kitcher himself offers intermittently a number of general remarks 
about why he is proceeding as he is, and in these passages he is a valua-
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ble and accurate guide to his own work. Nonetheless, it may be of some 
use to focus on these passages about, as it were, philosophico-ethico-
literary methodology more or less seriatim. The result of this focus on 
methodology will be substantially more flat-footed than Kitcher’s own 
writing, but it may also help to make Kitcher’s readings and reflections 
more available and significant to a wider range of readers than they 
might otherwise be. I divide my remarks about Kitcher’s way of proceed-
ing into two broad, related clusters: 1) Why philosophy and literature? 
and 2) philosophy as preparation for death. 
 
 
1) Why philosophy and literature? 
 
“Mann,” Kitcher tells us, “merits our attention as a contributor to the 
philosophical discussion in which his sources [Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and 
Wagner] were engaged” (10).1 Likewise, both the Britten opera and the Vis-
conti film count, for Kitcher, as “philosophical explorations in their own 
right” (10). In one sense, these claims may seem obvious and require no 
argument: each of these works focuses on a character, Gustav von 
Aschenbach, in the midst of a crisis about what is worth doing in life. 
But then one may also wonder: why should Mann’s or Britten’s or Vis-
conti’s accounts of a particular person undergoing a crisis of valuation 
themselves count as offering original and fruitful thinking about how to 
respond to philosophical problems rather than as merely illustrations of 
general theories of value that might be better worked out systematically 
elsewhere? 
One strand of answer that Kitcher offers to this question is that Ar-
istotelian-style general theories of value, developed by abstracting from, 
reflecting on, integrating, and generalizing over a range of cases of the 
achievement (or defeat) of value in ordinary life are themselves “shallow 
and inadequate” (18). Why might one think this? Part of the answer is 
that Mann, Wagner, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche share a sense that the 
world is not per se suffused with value and possibilities of meaningful 
life. This sense is plausible enough in modernity as an epoch of wide-
spread secularization, division of labor, and the development of forms of 
competitive individuality. There are no clearly evident natural or social 
phenomena into which any individual might integrate herself so as un-
problematically and unchallengeably to live well. The goods of friendship 
and meaningful work, even if available, are often enough circumscribed 
by class or gender antagonisms, in such a way that their achievement is 
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not likely to receive general endorsement. As a result, individual human 
beings are likely to retain a sense of powers of making meaningful life 
that might and should be better actualized otherwise. 
One aspect of a sense of pervasive antagonism and of human pow-
ers less than fully actualized surfaces in a conflict, thematic for Mann, be-
tween the values and life of a Wagnerian, mythical, outsider artist figure, 
who possesses exemplary powers of meaning making and the cultivation 
of individuality, but who is alienated from social life as it stands, and a 
Joycean ordinary citizen – Kitcher is thinking of Leopold Bloom in Ulysses 
– who is decent, forgiving, generous, and more or less socially integrated 
but at least potentially shallow (24). Or, as Kitcher puts the question that 
animates much of Mann’s work: “must any attempt to write (seriously) 
and simultaneously to live as an insider, a proper member of the bour-
geoisie, rest upon a trick, an illusion that will be unmasked if anyone is 
allowed to go behind the scenes?” (7). That is, must one choose between 
the intensities of art and the routines of ordinary life, between richly at-
tentive, expressive subjectivity and common life with others? This is a 
question that is central to twentieth-century artistic modernism, but it is 
also, I think, fair to say that this is a question about how to lead a 
worthwhile life that has not much been faced by standard, regnant moral 
philosophies.2 
This question while perhaps particularly pressing in modernity with 
its normalizing institutional apparatuses and within artistic modernism, 
is, moreover, itself metonymic for a yet larger question about how, if it 
all, it is possible to achieve enduring value in human life, how it is possi-
ble to live well. This larger question is about how, if at all, more or less 
Platonic-Apollonian, highly disciplined, redemptive meaning making that 
runs against the grain of commercial social life as it stands can be com-
bined with more or less Aristophanic-Dionysian eroticism, bodily experi-
ence, and commitment to the value of immersion in natural life 
processes, even to the point of the dissolution of identity. (Sexual experi-
ence is the natural model for what is to be valued in this latter Aristo-
phanic-Dionysian stance. Not for nothing do we have the expression le 
petit mort to describe one form of its culmination.) Schopenhauer – an 
important source for Mann – faced openly the question of how, if it all, 
it is possible for a world-representing, reflective human being to enjoy 
the continuous satisfaction of desire, and for Schopenhauer the answer is 
that it is not possible. World-representing and reflection abstract one 
from and in fact misrepresent the course of nature, and identity-
dissolving satisfactions of desire in sexual experience are at best tempo-
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rary and so necessarily fail to relieve the burdens of either reflection or 
desire effectively. For Mann with respect to Schopenhauer, as Kitcher 
puts it, “the metaphysics goes; the psychological theses remain” (49). 
That is, there is a genuine problem about “the difficulty, if not the im-
possibility, of finding value in human life” (51-52), a problem that con-
tinuously haunts Mann’s writing, even while he also is able to maintain 
some ironic distance on his own obsession with it (52). 
And it is this combination of obsession and ironic distance both in 
Mann and expressed in his writing that gives his works a special claim on 
our attention in relation to problems of meaning and valuation in human 
life. Mann’s particular honesty, and arguably the particular honesty of art 
as such, literary and otherwise, at its highest ranges of achievement, con-
sists in facing up to the problem of integrating form, individuation, dis-
cipline, and meaning-making with eroticism, immersion in natural life 
processes, and the dissolution of identity. (In Freudian terms, this 
amounts to the problem of responding productively to the imperatives 
of both the life-instinct or Eros and the death-instinct or Thanatos.) Fac-
ing up to these problems requires, significantly, more than merely either 
registering them or describing them, even with mature resignation (as in 
Schopenhauer and some strands of tragic virtue theory). Instead it in-
volves presenting dramas of temporally sustained, lived engagement with 
these problems as addressable, in various ways and with various conse-
quences, even if not solvable. We live, together with fully developed lit-
erary protagonists, within what Kitcher calls synthetic complexes (181) of 
emotions, judgments, conceptions, imaginings, perceptions, memories, 
and moods that are, at their deepest levels, responsive to the fundamen-
tal problems of the human situation. In doing so, the issue arises for us 
of whether any particular synthetic complex is stable (181). That is, have 
we, or has the protagonist of a literary work, thought, felt, remembered, 
perceived, imagined, and judged as a whole in a way that is continuously 
livable over time? If so, one will have exercised distinctively human powers 
of attention, response, and meaning making in a way that is good enough 
to merit reflective endorsement, even if the problem of continuing within 
any synthetic complex is not thereby brought to an absolute end. If not, 
then adjustments to the elements of the synthetic complex are in order.  
A work of art, pre-eminently a literary work in which a protagonist 
is presented as living within such an evolving synthetic complex in rela-
tion to an evolving problem situation, can call up our own synthetic 
complexes, related to those of the protagonist in virtue of a shared prob-
lem situation at a deep level. Hence a work of literary art can prompt re-
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flection, as well as changes in feeling, mood, and imagining, as the ele-
ments of any synthetic complex are tested for aptness to their target situ-
ation and for stability in relation to one another. This is, moreover, true 
not only of literary art at its highest levels of achievement, but also of 
high art as such. A mood or emotion or imagining may be invited and 
sustained by a pattern of intentionally organized sounds or images that 
have to do with fundamental human problems, even without direct de-
scription or presentation of the travails of a particular protagonist. Hence 
there are powerful “affinities among works of art, music, and literature 
and philosophical themes” even if these forms of work are “radically ex-
ternal” to one another if considered materially and medially rather than 
functionally (149).  
This picture of the role of synthetic complexes in our lives and of 
how they may develop toward increased stability and aptness to the con-
ditions of life implies a picture of maturity as a matter of living within a 
relatively stable synthetic complex that is not hubristically closed off 
from yet further development. According to this picture, the role of phi-
losophy, or at least of the kind of philosophy that takes problems of val-
ue in human life as its subject, cannot be to prescribe any single, fully 
formed, correct valuational stance. (Given his other work, it seems plau-
sible to surmise that Kitcher has developed this view out of his reading 
of Dewey.) Instead of aiming impossibly toward fixed legislative authori-
ty according to principle,3 philosophizing about value within human life 
should, for Kitcher, be understood as aiming “to bring [one’s readers or 
auditors] to a previously unanticipated perspective, a different Gestalt on 
life and on the factors that make a difference to its mattering.”4 As 
Kitcher puts it, “the philosophy lies in the showing” (23) that a literary 
writer, a composer, a filmmaker, a critic, or a philosopher may accom-
plish, insofar as such a showing is able to guide us in modifying our syn-
thetic complexes in the direction of increased alertness and stability. 
“The true Artist-Erzieher [ – a conception of his own cultural role that 
Mann developed out of his reading of Nietzsche and that Mann himself 
fulfilled in exemplary fashion, according to Kitcher – ] seeks an extreme 
standard of reflective stability, one in which the most basic endorse-
ments are embedded in synthetic complexes again and again scrutinized 
from perspective after perspective” (187). Hence true Artist-Erzieher-
composer-filmmaker-critic-philosophers function for their audiences 
(and for themselves) as bootstrapping devices, continually refashioning 
their synthetic complexes in the direction of increased stability and alert-
ness to life and to values within it.5 
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2) Philosophy as preparation for death  
 
Given the picture of maturity in valuational stances that Kitcher 
elaborates out of the achievements and defeats of Gustav von Aschen-
bach variously presented, there can be no such thing as a life of unam-
biguous and absolute value. As Kitcher puts it, “the vindications of the 
past never seem adequate to the shadows that fall on the present, and 
even the effort to solve the problem [of vindicating the value of a life] 
once and for all by denying the need for vindication cannot succeed” 
(146). Arguably, modesty and humility alone will likewise not suffice to 
dispel these shadows,6 and the need for vindication will be haunted by a 
sense of its unavailability, at least in any absolutely redemptive terms.7 
Hence there will come for many, as it comes for Gustav von Aschen-
bach in gazing at Tadzio on the sandbar at the moment of his death, “a 
moment at which the call for more striving can be –should be – refused, 
when the desire for dissolution, for a final union with the vast simplicity 
of the cosmos becomes acceptable and compelling” (174).  
Kitcher explores the nature of this moment and how one might 
best meet it by considering the music of Mahler, the composer whose 
Adagietto from the Fifth Symphony Visconti used as a major portion of 
the soundtrack for his film version of Death in Venice. Visconti’s Gustav 
von Aschenbach is, Kitcher rightly notes, not Mann’s: Visconti’s lacks 
the “homoerotic yearnings,” “rigorous inherited discipline,” and classi-
cal-Platonic “striving for purity of form” that are distinctive of Mann’s 
(and of Mann himself) (135). Nonetheless, Visconti’s version brings into 
the foreground this problem of coming to terms with human finitude 
and of living with and within less than absolute vindication that is central 
for Mann’s Aschenbach, for Mann himself, and for Mahler. In close 
readings of Mahler’s symphonies, Das Lied von der Erde, and Kindertoten-
lieder, Kitcher traces Mahler’s continuing “impetus to affirm, despite hu-
man finitude, the enduring significance of life’s joys and beauties” (137). 
Most fully in the final movement of Das Lied von der Erde, as the soprano 
completes the lines “The lovely earth all over /Blooms in the spring and 
grows green anew /Everywhere, and the distance forever shines blue, / 
Forever, forever” with a triple pianissimo repeated “Ewig,” set over quad-
ruple pianissimo strings, flute, and oboe in their lower registers, all in a 
continual ritenuto, one can hear in Mahler a “closing moment of serenity 
[that] restores the connection between the life that is ending and the in-
definitely renewed earth” (167). Or  
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the symphonies can be heard – perhaps almost always are heard – 
as struggles to reach a moment of affirmation. For that moment to 
emerge, it must be preceded by a real sense of the poles of 
experience as they have been felt in the recent life of the composer; 
there must be darkness and sorrow, bitterness and defeat, ecstasy 
and wonder, whimsy and everyday happiness (142). 
 
In each case, what is needed and what is provided is a “gesture that pro-
duces consolation through the fact that it can be made” (144) so that 
“the act of affirmation endorses itself” (145), despite its being imperfect 
and set within the temporal flow of nature’s development that human 
subjectivity is unable to overcome or fully to master. “The answer [is] 
expressed in the music” and shown, not “directly stated” (171). It is of-
fered to us by the composer in order to solicit and sustain our imagina-
tive and emotional identification with the gesture, through which we 
might arrive at an experience of consolation rather than a discursively 
formulated answer to the problem of vindicating one’s life in time. A 
similar sort of showing and offering is present, too, in the twinned imag-
es that occur near the end of Doktor Faustus of the lingering smell of Max 
Schweigestill’s pipe set against the lingering sound of “the high g of a 
cello, the last word, the last suspended sound, in a pianissimo fermata, 
slowly fading” (178, quoting Doktor Faustus) of Adrian Leverkuhn’s ora-
torio The Lamentation of Doktor Faustus. In each of these images, there is 
“a mixture of affirmation and abnegation, the one grounded in a recogni-
tion of what [one] has done and its reverberations in the continuing 
world, the other based on knowing that [one’s work] is incomplete and 
that the echoes [it] leaves will eventually diminish into silence” (176).8 In 
each case – the ending of Das Lied von der Erde, the struggles and mo-
ments of relative acceptance in Mahler’s symphonies, the smell of 
Schweigestill’s pipe, the lingering cello high g, and (forming the center of 
the family grouping or perspicuous representation that these cases estab-
lish) Gustav von Aschenbach’s gaze toward Tadzio in meeting his death 
– we are, Kitcher suggests, offered “a philosophical contribution that 
goes beyond Nietzsche and Schopenhauer” (171) (as well as beyond any 
simple formulae) through which we might, by identifying with the image 
or gesture, ourselves come to terms with the nature and value of our 
human lives in time. The best preparation for death is to resonate emo-
tionally and imaginatively with such offerings, along with leading a life in 
which moments of such resonances are woven through the texture of 
whatever it is that one otherwise does. Es war doch so schön. 
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This is not to say that friendship, family, love, politics, inquiry or 
whatever one is otherwise involved in do not matter. Nor does it deny 
the importance of such things as rights and duties or either cognitive or 
moral virtues. Prior to meeting his death on the Venice Lido in his gaze 
toward Tadzio on the sandbar and the sea beyond, Gustav von Aschen-
bach (like Thomas Mann) had led a life of disciplined commitment to the 
generation of artistic forms through which human perceptions and sen-
sibilities might be elevated, and he had also, apparently, led a good 
enough bourgeois family life, whatever homoerotic yearnings it also in-
cluded. In this Aschenbach and Mann exemplify the value that is named 
by Aschenbach’s watchword “Durchhalten”: persistence, or discipline, or 
endurance, or seeing things through. Friendships, loves, work, citizen-
ship, and other involvements must be taken seriously, with full respon-
siveness to their imperatives, not merely engaged in for pleasure or 
show. But such involvements will also best have their own value – will 
be most human and least marked by time-denying hubris – when they 
are also informed by participation in images and gestures of finitude. 
Philosophy’s wisdom in figuring preparation for death is best achieved 
not in principles or plans alone, but also and more centrally through par-
ticipation in such images and gestures.  
Is this suggestion about philosophy’s wisdom right? If it is, then, 
paradoxically, this question should itself have no simple answer. Instead 
the answer should be displayed in the generation and reception of such 
images and gestures, ever anew, in response to both the changing condi-
tions of human life and the deep facts of human finitude and human 
powers of reflection. It is difficult not to think of Philip Kitcher himself 
as, at the deepest stratum of his writing, setting himself as a philosopher-
critic-writer in producing his study next to Aschenbach, Mann, Visconti, 
Britten, and Mahler as one who shows in his own articulate responses to 
art and life how an achievement and acknowledgment of a good-enough 
life is possible. 
Friedrich Hölderlin gave up philosophy in favor of poetry upon re-
alizing that the absolute character of the whole of nature in which we live 
is something that we cannot grasp as finite, discursive creatures, so that we 
are fated to live, well or badly, with the fact of reflection always en mésure 
unsatisfied, the problem of orientation on the basis of knowledge of spe-
cifically legislative absolute values always en mésure unsolved. He suggested 
and showed in his major poetry that we might live most fitly with this 
fate by moving through moments of selfhood and independence, on the 
one hand, modulated with moments of love and absorption, on the oth-
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er.9 Wordsworth arrived similarly at the orientation-defeating thought 
“Hard task, vain hope, to analyse the mind, /If each most obvious and 
particular thought, /Not in a mystical and idle sense, /But in the words of 
Reason deeply weighed, /Hath no beginning,”10 and he pursued orienta-
tion more modestly through the recovery and rehearsal of moments of 
experience that alternated between fear and beauty, apocalypse and 
akedah, selfhood and absorption.11 To think the achievement of wisdom 
on the part of finite reflective creatures who lack absolute orientation as a 
matter of alternations, modulations, recoveries, rehearsals, and workings-
through of complexes of mood, affect, judgment, perception, and 
thought is to see philosophy, insofar as it pursues this wisdom, as more 
akin to art and criticism than to mathematics and science. Given current 
academic formations, this suggestion will not be to every philosopher’s 
(or every literary scholar’s) liking. But it is, nonetheless, faithful to fun-
damental facts of human existence. 
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1 I use numerals in parentheses to refer to the page numbers in Deaths in 
Venice.  
2 One philosophical writer who has taken this question seriously is Stanley 
Cavell in his accounts and defenses of moral perfectionism. But Cavell himself 
insists that perfectionism is not a moral theory that competes with Kantianism 
or utilitarianism, but is instead a concern with an aspect or dimension of human 
life that is aslant to concerns with permissibility and obligations to others, and 
Cavell himself is not an orthodox moral philosopher. This point applies likewise 
to some more or less philosophical writers who form part of Cavell’s canon but 
are themselves not widely received within mainstream academic moral philoso-
phy: Emerson, Thoreau, and Nietzsche. For an insightful survey of Cavell’s 
thinking about morality, see Stanley Bates, “Cavell on Ethics,” in Stanley Cavell, 
ed. Richard Eldridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 15-47. 
3 Plausibly, some forms of Kantianism that emphasize both the perfec-
tionist strand of Kant’s thinking, centering around the priority of imperfect du-
ties, and the necessary open-endedness of imaginative casuistry with respect to 
an abstract principle that is quite different from any more or less specific rule of 
thumb, might also fit with this stance. I have argued for this kind of perfection-
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ist Kantianism in my On Moral Personhood: Philosophy, Literature, Criticism, and Self-
Understanding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).  
4 Here there are interesting affinities with Arnold Isenberg’s conception of 
the proper task of the art critic as offering not verdicts but “directions for per-
ceiving” that may or may not be taken up (“Critical Communication,” Philosophi-
cal Review 57 [July 1949], pp. 330-44; reprinted in The Philosophy of Art: Readings 
Ancient and Modern, eds. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley [New York: McGraw Hill, 
1995], pp. 363-73, at p. 367. Building on related work by Stanley Cavell (“Aes-
thetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” in Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? 
[New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1969] pp. 73-96), both Ted Cohen and I 
have suggested that Isenberg’s picture of the activity of the art critic also aptly 
describes the activity of the philosopher, at least with respect to problems of valu-
ation in human life. See Ted Cohen, Thinking of Others: On the Talent for Metaphor 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 22-23, and Richard Eldridge, 
Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 4-5. 
5 Kitcher suggests that understanding how progress of this kind is possible 
would require “a psychological account and a synthesis of psychology with phi-
losophy that we do not yet have” (244, n. 120). I think the situation is not quite 
so bleak. Not only is there what Kitcher describes, with excessive modesty, as 
his “spare sketch” (244n.120) of the development of synthetic complexes, there 
is also rich work by a range of figures who develop a similar line of thinking. I 
have in mind, among other things, Aristotle on catharsis (and contemporary 
clarificationist developments of this concept in contemporary philosophy of litera-
ture), Spinoza on moving from passively suffered affections to actively maintained 
ones, Wordsworth on the strengthening and purifying of affections in his Lyrical 
Ballads Preface, and above all Collingwood in The Principles of Art. I have made 
some effort to develop and integrate these lines of thinking in Literature, Life, and 
Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 19-22, 109-14.  
6 A good Humean might deny the need for strong vindication and urge us 
to accept finitude and naturalness and to take to avocations such as backgam-
mon rather than aiming to fulfill any objective vocation for humanity. To a 
Humean, those who seek strong vindication might be regarded as suffering 
from overly rigid superego development and weak ego formation. It is a canny 
insight on Kitcher’s part that this kind of Humean stance is itself legible as a 
form of claiming vindication through humility tinged with the pride of claiming 
it. Can one humbly claim humility? 
7 This need for vindication, haunted by a sense of its unavailability, is what 
lies behind the motif in German thought of Sehnsucht nach dem Tod, as in Hölderlins 
drama Empedocles and in Freud’s treatment of the death instinct. 
8 Kitcher is here characterizing the final moments of Gustav von Aschen-
bach’s life, but now as illuminated by one what can also hear in Mahler and find 
in Doktor Faustus. 
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9 For an overview, building on Dieter Henrich’s epochal work, of how 
Hölderlin’s major poetry emerges out of his move away from philosophy, see 
Richard Eldridge, “To Bear the Momentarily Incomplete: Subject Development 
and Expression in Hegel and Holderlin,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal: Spe-
cial Issue on Expressivism, 27, 2 (2006), pp. 141-58. 
10 William Wordsworth, The Prelude or, Growth of a Poet’s Mind [1850] in 
Wordsworth, Selected Poems and Prefaces, ed. Jack Stillinger (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1965), II, 228-32, p. 212. 
11 The terms apocalypse and akedah are Geoffrey Hartman’s in his Words-
worths Poetry, 1787-1814, 3d. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). For 
an overview of Wordsworth’s recollective-narrative response to the problem of 
orientation, see Richard Eldridge, “Internal Transcendentalism: Wordsworth 
and A New Condition of Philosophy,” in Eldridge, The Persistence of Romanti-




Un artículo de revision sobre el libro de Philip Kicher, Muertes en Venecia, que se 
concentra 1) en el papel distintivo que las obras literarias pueden y deben desempeñar (y, 
de hecho desempeñan) en la reflexión moral sobre el signficado y el valor de la vida hu-
mana y 2) en el papel que las imágenes y los gestos de finitud pueden desempeñar en 
nuestro reconocimiento y preparación para la muerte. 
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ABSTRACT 
A review essay on Philip Kitcher’s Death’s in Venice, concentrating 1) on the dis-
tinctive role that literary works can, do, and should play in moral thinking about meaning 
and value in human life, and 2) on the role that images and gestures of finitude can play 
in acknowledging and preparing for death. 
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